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Abstract
Organization in hierarchical dominance structures is prevalent in animal societies, so a strong preference for higher
positions in social ranking is likely to be an important motivation of human social and economic behavior. This preference is
also likely to influence the way in which we evaluate our outcome and the outcome of others, and finally the way we
choose. In our experiment participants choose among lotteries with different levels of risk, and can observe the choice that
others have made. Results show that the relative weight of gains and losses is the opposite in the private and social domain.
For private outcomes, experience and anticipation of losses loom larger than gains, whereas in the social domain, gains
loom larger than losses, as indexed by subjective emotional evaluations and physiological responses. We propose a
theoretical model (interdependent utilities), predicting the implication of this effect for choice behavior. The relatively larger
weight assigned to social gains strongly affects choices, inducing complementary behavior: faced with a weaker competitor,
participants adopt a more risky and dominant behavior.
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Introduction
In the postal code lottery conducted in the Netherlands your
ticket is linked to your postal code [1]. The lottery is very popular
and this is perhaps due to the strong regret you would feel if you
had not bought the ticket and your code was selected. However, a
second strong emotion may be operating: if your code is selected,
your neighbors who had bought the ticket will win the lottery, and
envy would be added to regret.
We study here the link between emotions in individual and
social settings. Recent research on the neural basis of regret [2,3]
suggests that this emotion has an important role in learning to
evaluate our actions: the counterfactual thinking [4] (‘‘I would
have been better off by choosing the other option’’) keeps a record
for future use of the outcome of our past choices compared to the
available alternatives. Envy may have a similar role, operating as
the social analogue of regret (‘‘I would have been better off by
choosing the option he chose’’). The issue we address is whether
there is more to envy than this counterfactual thought. With envy
we also keep track of our social status by coding the loss of social
rank produced by an inferior outcome. This suggests an additional
component of emotions associated with different relative out-
comes, such as envy (for unfavorable differences, social losses) and
gloating (for favorable ones, social gains)[5,6]. We consider envy
and gloating as complex, events-based emotions related to the
fortune of others [5]. While envy refers to a comparison between
someone’s negative situation and another individual’s positive
situation, gloating refers to a comparison between someone’s
positive situation and another individual’s less fortunate situation
[6]. Thus envy and gloating both involve social comparison.
A rich research tradition in sociology [7], social psychology [8–
12] and economics [13–15] has also demonstrated how concern
for status strongly motivates human behavior. For example a
major determinant of workers’ effort is how their income is ranked
within their firm [16]. More generally, happiness and well-being
are strongly affected by the comparison between the individual’s
own income and the income of others [17–20].
From the Social Comparison Theory [9] we derive the insight
that individuals use the comparison with others to evaluate their
own opinion and abilities, or in other words that comparison is
informative for the subject who makes the comparison. Hence
individuals have an incentive to gather and process this
information. Upward comparisons are motivated by self improve-
ment (improving one’s own abilities) which aims at enhancing
social status [21], while the opportunity to compare with a less
fortunate other enhances subjective well-being [22,23].
Social actions, such as consumption, are used to communicate
to others a signal about some private information that is relevant
for the social ranking of the individual. The social signal has to be
costly, or else it could be easily mimicked. For instance, according
to Veblen [7], conspicuous consumption has to be wasteful. In our
experiment, the cost is the distortion away from the choice that
would maximize expected utility. This is induced by the concern
for the public signal introduces.
The goal of this study was first to directly compare how
individuals evaluate the outcome of their decision in private versus
social contexts, with the hypothesis that for a given outcome, social
context will enhance emotional responses due to social comparison.
Second, the study was designed to investigate whether social and
private emotions influence monetary decisions in different ways.
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and Supporting Text S1) and experimentally disentangle the
two components of these social emotions: (i) learning to evaluate
our actions and (ii) keeping track of our ranking. The learning
component is common to existing theories of regret [24–27]. In
these theories, learning adjusts the probability of choosing an
action depending on the difference between the total rewards that
could have been obtained with the choice of that action and the
realized total rewards. The theory of interdependent utilities that
we adopt is a general form of the regret theory. When the foregone
action is an action that was available but not chosen, the function
gamma (see Methods and Supporting Text S1) represents
regret/relief; when it is an action chosen by others, it represents
envy/gloating. The emotions we study may be considered as the
affective evaluation of a difference between an expected and a
realized value. This general hypothesis assigns to emotions a
functional role, similar to the one fulfilled by the adjustment to
prediction error: in this view, learning is adaptive learning, and it
adjusts the current evaluation of an action to a new and updated
value. Emotions keep track of the difference between expected and
realized value, and increase or decrease the value depending on
the difference. Within this hypothesis, emotions do not necessarily
interfere with rational decision making, and on the contrary they
may implement it: they are a way of evaluating past outcomes to
adjust choices in the future.
We show experimentally that the ranking component adds to
the learning one, so that the social emotions have stronger effects
than their private counterparts, they operate differently, and they
affect our behavior in a deeper way.
In our experiment participants choose among lotteries, with
different levels of risk, and observe the choice that others have
made. They are then informed of the monetary outcome of their
choice and the choice of others, and have the opportunity in this
way to experience regret and envy, or their positive counterparts
(relief and gloating). Two players participated in each experimental
session (Fig. 1). In each trial participants were first informed about
the condition in which they were going to play, which could be one
ortwo players.Theywerethenpresentedwithtwo lotteriesandthey
had to choose one of the two. In the one player trial, the participant
was then informed of the outcome of the lottery he had chosen and
the outcome of the other lottery. In the two player trials after his
choice he was informed of the choice of the other participant, which
could bethe same thathehadselectedornot.Hewastheninformed
of the outcome of the two lotteries: so he would be able to compare
his outcome and the outcome of the other. After each trial, the
player rated his subjective feeling on the outcome he had just
observed, using a slider scale from extremely negative to extremely
positive. Emotional arousal [28] was assessed by recording the skin
conductance responses (SCR) and heart rate of all participants
during the entire experiment. Physiological measures provide a
robustness check for the subjective ratings.
Six events are possible on each trial, depending on the condition
(one or two players), both players’ choices (same or different) and on
the outcome (gain or loss relative to the other lottery’s outcome). In
our classification, each event is associated with an emotion. We did
not directly assess whether these discrete emotions were evoked in
participants, thus the emotion terms are intended to label emotional
events consistent with the context in which they occur, according to
the appraisal theory of emotions [29]. Relief and regret are the
events occurring in the one player trials when the payoff of the
participant was larger or smaller than the one of the non chosen
lottery; shared relief and shared regret occur in two players trials
when both players made the same choice; and gloating and envy
occur when their choices were different.
Results
Social competitive emotions are stronger than their
private counterparts
The results of self evaluation of emotional state about the
choice’s outcome showed that relief, shared relief and gloating
received an average positive score, while the other three events
had a negative rating (Fig. 2, and Table S1). Different
physiological responses corresponded to positive and negative
emotional events; for instance, participants’ heart rates were
significantly higher for the three positive emotions compared with
the negative ones (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (WSRT),
Z=4.283, P=0.0001, Fig. 3A). SCR measures did not distinguish
between positive and negative emotional events. A Friedman tests
revealed a significant effect of the social context (with three levels,
private, social same and different choices) for both positive
(x
2=30.33, P,0.001) and negative emotions (x
2=29.19,
P,0.001). Those in the two players condition received a stronger
rating (larger in absolute value) than their correspondent in the
single player trial. Specifically, gloating was stronger than relief
(WSRT, Z=4.03, P,0.001), and envy was stronger than regret
(WSRT, Z=2.75, P=0.035). On the other hand, the shared
emotions in the two player trials had a weaker rating than did their
single player correspondent: relief was stronger than shared relief
(WSRT, Z=4.62, P,0.001), and regret was stronger than shared
regret (WSRT, Z=4.12, P,0.001, see Tables S2 and S3 for all
tests). Even when controlling for the obtained outcome, the effect
of social context still holds for both negative (F(3, 119)=219.551,
P,0.001) and positive emotions (F(3, 116)=104.996, P,0.001).
Notably, we did not find any gender differences, neither in the
evaluation of the emotional events (P.0.4 for all 6 events), nor in
total earnings (P.0.2) nor in choice time (P.0.4). The unobtained
outcome of the chosen lottery might also modulate the subjective
evaluation of the obtained outcome and result in the feeling of
disappointment and elation [2]. However, emotional ratings are
dominated by the comparison between the outcomes of the two
lotteries. Moreover, the amplification effect in the envy and
gloating events still operates even when controlling for the effect of
the unobtained outcome of the chosen lottery (Table S4). To
measure the arousal associated with the outcome evaluation in the
different events we recorded participants’ skin conductance
responses (SCR). This auxiliary measure offers a strong support
to our interpretation of the self-reported emotional evaluations.
Data on self reporting rates and physiological responses are
extremely consistent in our experiment. The correlation between
the subjective rating and the SCR is high (r=0.932) and
significant (P=0.0067). A Friedman test revealed a significant
effect of the social factor (x
2=10.22, P=0.005) on SCR
measurements.
Comparisons between obtained and unobtained outcomes in the
two player trials, when the participants made different choices,
resulted in an amplification of the emotional responses, as also
indexed by SCR (Fig. 3B). Thus the interdependence (based on
socialstatus) betweenthe twoparticipantsstrengthenstheemotional
experience when assessing the consequence of one’s choice.
Social gains loom larger than social losses
The emotional evaluation was significantly higher (WSRT,
Z=1.989, P=0.046) for social gains than for social losses (Fig. 4).
Moreover, gloating is the emotional response with the highest
SCR (Table S1). Thus, contrary to the private domain [3,30],
social gains loom larger than social losses. We performed an
ANOVA on mean emotional ratings of private gain (of relief
minus rejoice, M=22.68, SEM=2.22, relief and rejoice were not
Interdependent Utilities
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regret, M=6.16, SEM=3.26), social gain (M=7.41, SEM=1.45)
and social loss (M=3.71, SEM=1.27). The ANOVA revealed a
significant interaction between domain (private vs. social) and
valence (gain vs. loss, F(1,40)=6.949, P=0.012). We conclude
from this analysis that indeed in the private domain, losses loom
larger than gains while in the social domain, gains loom larger
than losses.
How social emotions affect choice behavior
Subjective ratings, SCR and heart rate measurements might
simply indicate affective responses with no consequence on
behavior. Our model of choice with interdependent utilities (see
Methods and Supporting Text S1) suggests otherwise: once
participants experience the fact that the others’ choice will affect
the utility they derive from their outcome they will anticipate this
effect on future trials, and take it into consideration at the moment
of choice by accounting for anticipated emotions.
The experiment was designed to analyze this effect, by
randomly allocating participants to two treatments that we may
call bold and prudent. In the bold one, participants were facing the
choices of the other as determined by a computer programmed to
select the lottery with the higher expected value, irrespective of the
risk. In the prudent one, the choices of the program minimized the
variance of the outcomes of the lottery and therefore were those of
an extremely risk averse decision maker. The use of two different
criteria (expected value and risk) implied that the choice of the
opponent that participants were facing differed on a substantial
Figure 1. Experimental Design. Time line in the typical single (on the left) and two player trial. Numbers indicated outcomes, and the probabilities
were represented by colored sectors of a circle. Each lottery was surrounded with one dotted square in the case of a one player trial or two dotted
squares of different colors in the case of a two player trial. In one player trials, after they made their choice the square surrounding the chosen lottery
became continuous and the other dotted square disappeared. In two player trials, the selected lottery was marked with a green square, and the
lottery chosen by the other player (possibly the same) with a yellow square. The other player’s choice was displayed after the participant’s choice.
After both players had made their choice, the participant observed an arrow spinning on both lotteries. Approximately 6 s later, outcomes were
indicated by the final position of the arrows, showing how much he won and how much he would have won, and (on two player trials) how much
the other won. Subjective emotional evaluation. At the end of each trial the participant indicated his subjective feeling on a scale from 250
(‘‘Extremely Negative’’), through 0 (‘‘Neither Positive nor Negative’’) up to +50 (‘‘Extremely Positive’’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.g001
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participants were facing two different competitors: one group had
tough competitors, with high average payoff, the other weaker
competitors with relatively lower average earnings.
The model we report (see Methods and Supporting Text
S1) predicts that if participants derive more utility from social
gains (gloating) than dis-utility from social losses (envy), their
behavior in the two environments will be significantly different,
and dependent on the behavior of the opponent. The dependence
is not based on imitation (in line with [31]): Rather than adjusting
to the different environment by mimicking the behavior of the
other, participants should behave boldly in the prudent environ-
ment, and prudently in the bold one.
The evidence provided by subjective emotional evaluations and
SCR data suggests that participants are indeed more sensitive to
social gains than to social losses, so the condition that participants
like winning more than they dislike losing is satisfied. Therefore we
should observe that the behavior of participants is the opposite of
that of their opponent.
Effect of the environment on choice: evidence for
complementary behavior
A simple way of measuring this effect is to estimate the
contribution of the lotteries’ expected value and standard
deviation (risk) to the probability of choice. Regression analysis
on choice behavior over all participants and trials show that the
estimated coefficients for each of these two variables have the
expected sign: a higher expected value increases the probability of
choice of the lottery; a higher variance reduces this probability
(Table 1). Moreover, the participants were risk averse in the gain
domain and risk seeking for loss (Table 1: the variable giving the
interaction between risk and loss is positive, P=0.001), as
predicted by Prospect Theory [32]. Notably, there was no
difference in the way males and females made their choice in
term of risk end expected value.
When considering the effect of the two environments, the results
showed no difference in choices made in the initial trials in which
the participants in the two groups observed the same choices of the
opponent; but a significant difference appeared in later trials
(Tables S6 and S7). Figure 5A shows that in later trials
participants in the bold treatment (risk neutral computer) became
relatively more risk averse, while participants in the prudent
treatment showed the opposite pattern of behavior.
Experienced emotions, anticipated emotions, and choice
What produced this difference in choice behavior between the
two groups? The participants in the two groups experienced very
different relative payoffs compared to the opponent, and this
Figure 2. Emotional responses: Average subjective emotional
evaluations for different events. The bars represent the average
value (6SEM) of the subjective emotional evaluation given by
participants in the different events. The pictures around the horizontal
axis show the typical screen display seen by participants in the different
events.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.g002
Figure 3. Physiological responses. (a) Variation in Heart Rate
for positive and negative events. Vertical bars represent the
average value (6SEM) of the participants’ heart rate variation from
baseline (2 seconds before the outcome), in beats per minute. (b)
Magnitude of the skin conductance responses (SCR). The bars
represent the SCR magnitude in microsiemens after the outcomes of
the lotteries were displayed. Data are classified by condition for each
participant: individual condition (regret and relief), social condition
when both players made the same choice (shared regret and shared
relief) and social condition when the payers chose different lotteries
(envy and gloating). Table S1 reports the SCR magnitude for each
emotional event.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.g003
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measured by the frequency of occurrence of the various emotional
events, and by the average difference in the payments for the two
participants in that event. For example, the measure for gloating is
provided by the difference between the participant’s payoff and
the opponent’s payoff.
The only type of event for which the difference is significant is
gloating (when we consider number of occurrences or value), and
this difference is large (Figure 5B and Table S8). Participants
facing a prudent opponent had a proportion of trials in which
gloating was experienced that was double the proportion of the
same type of trials for participants facing a bold opponent (Table
S9, 13.45 per cent instead of 7.08, that is a 6.37 per cent
difference, Mann-Whitney U test: Z=5.243; P,0.001). The
average total dollar value of gloating was 133 dollars more for
the participants in the prudent treatment than for those in the bold
treatment (Mann-Whitney U test: Z=25.137; P,0.001). The
difference for envy is smaller and non-significant (Mann-Whitney
U test: P.0.2): 10.3 instead of 9.1 for the frequency of occurrence,
and 174 instead of 183 for the difference in value.
The cumulated effect of this difference over trials is likely to
affect behavior: participants who experience gloating in the past
may be more likely to make risky choices in the future. To test
whether past gloating affects behavior, we computed the average
value of the difference in payment associated with type of events in
the first 40 trials, and tested the effect they had on choices made in
the later trials. For example, the mean value of the envy is
measured by the mean value of the difference between the
opponent’s payoff and the participant’s payoff in the early envy
trials. The past experience affects choice in the later trials: in
complete agreement with the data provided by the subjective
evaluations, gloating has a strong and significant effect, and
reinforces risk loving behavior (P=0.021 for the estimated
coefficient in the panel logit regression: see Table S10); the
marginal effect is 3.18 percentage points to the dollar.
The difference in choice behavior between the two groups of
participants is the joint consequence of the effect of gloating on risk
aversion and the difference in the amount of gloating experienced
by the participants. Both are influenced by the past choices of the
participant and of the other player. Gloating is the only emotion
that shows a significant marginal effect (Table S10) as well as a
large difference among the total amounts experienced by
participants. The net effect is the significantly higher level of risk
loving behavior in participants in the prudent treatment. In
conclusion, the environment in this experiment influences
behavior. The way in which this happens is not by imitation,
but by producing the most rewarding behavior in a competitive
environment.
Discussion
The theoretical model that we present predicts that socially
motivated emotions like envy and gloating combine the learning
function (that they share with emotions like regret and relief) with
the response to changes of one’s social status.
We have three main findings. Emotions in the two-player
condition, for the events in which participants made different
choices, are stronger than in the single player condition. The
second result is that social emotions operate differently from
private ones: while regret looms larger than relief, gloating looms
larger than envy. The third result is that participants behaved
boldly in the prudent environment (against a weak opponent) and
prudently in the bold one (against a bold opponent).
Our initial hypothesis was that socially motivated emotions like
envy and gloating combine the learning function (that they share
with emotions like regret and relief) with the response to changes
of one’s social status. Indeed, we saw that both components are
relevant. Emotions in the two-player condition, when the
participants made different choices, were stronger than in the
single player condition.
The effect in not induced by any social emotion (as opposed to
non-social) as shared regret and shared relief received weaker
ratings than regret and relief experienced in a non-social context.
Thus, envy and gloating matter more because they are socially
competitive emotions, not just interpersonal ones. Moreover, this
effect takes place even if the interaction between the two
participants was minimal: they were clearly instructed that the
payment would not depend in any way on the performance of the
other participant. One possible hypothesis is that the effects we
find are due to attention drawn to the lottery chosen by the other
Figure 4. Difference between subjective evaluations in social
and private domains. On the left we report the difference for gains
(gloating minus relief), on the right the one for losses (regret minus
envy).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.g004
Table 1. Regression analysis of participants’ choice.
Variable name Coefficient Standard error Z P
dev 0.276 0.012 22.42 ,0.001
dsd 20.031 0.010 23.16 0.002
dsd*loss 0.048 0.015 3.24 0.001
constant 20.121 0.041 22.94 0.003
Number of subjects=42; number of observations=3360. Data from all trials
(t=80).
Log likelihood=21944.3451, Wald chi2(3)=596.32, Prob.chi2=0.000.
The table reports the coefficients estimated in the logistic regression of the
choice made by participants. The dependent variable choice is equal to 1 if the
participant chose the lottery 1 and 0 if the participant chose the lottery 2. The
variable dev is the difference between the expected value of the first and
second lottery (when participants maximize expected values the coefficient is
positive); the variable dsd is the difference between the standard deviation of
the first and second lottery (a negative coefficient indicates participants’ risk
averse behavior). The variable dsd
* loss is equal to the latter when the
expected value of the two lotteries is negative: this coefficient captures the loss
aversion of participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.t001
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single player and shared outcomes events, since the attention
hypothesis suggests that there would be no difference between
private and shared emotions: but this was not the case. Besides,
even when both players made the same choice the payoff of the
non chosen lottery influenced emotional ratings while the
unobtained payoff of the chosen lottery did not (Table S5 and
Supporting Text S2).
There are many factors influencing our status (that is, the
position relative to others) following the observation of the
outcome. One factor is the outcome itself (the payment of the
lottery, in our experiment) that can for example affect our relative
wealth position. This factor would operate even if a good outcome
is completely due to chance, and does not signal anything on our
ability. A second factor is the updating of the opinion we have of
our own ability, we feel better if someone else does not do well,
because our opinion on our current relative position is improved.
Yet another factor is the observation by a third party of the relative
performance. In this case too a poor performance of the others is
better because our relative standing improves.
T h et h e o r yw ep r e s e n tp r e d i c t st h ee c o n o m i ca n a l o g u eo ft h e
dominance complementarity observed in postural relationship [31],
where a dominant posture is likely to induce a submissive one, and
vice-versa. We observed in fact that participants behaved boldly in
the prudent environment (against a weak opponent) and prudently in
the bold one (against a competitive opponent). It is interesting to note
that this effect seems to happen outside the participants’ awareness.
They reported in an ex-post debriefing questionnaire that they had
not been influenced by the other player’s choice behavior.
Social emotions operate differently from private ones: while
regret (private loss) looms larger than relief (private gain)[2,3],
gloating (social gain) looms larger than envy (social loss) (Fig. 6).
In the theory that is the background of the paper (IUT) choice is
based on the anticipation of the emotion that the individual will
experience after the outcome has been revealed. Figure 6,
contrasting the value of private versus social gains and losses, is
within this conceptual framework. It describes anticipated
emotions. How are anticipated and actually experienced emotions
linked? We provide insights on the interaction between the two.
The data on choice allow us to estimate this anticipated state. The
data on ex post evaluation allow us to measure experienced states.
For example, the influence that past experiences have on later
choices is produced by the actual experience of envy, gloating, and
other emotions that is the way in which experienced emotions
modify the anticipated emotions.
These findings suggest an important difference between the
private and the social dimensions. In both cases deviations from
expected utility are explained by the effect of the difference
between the obtained outcome and the alternative possible
outcome. In the private domain, the alternative outcome is that
of an action that was not chosen, and aversion to loss (regret)
dominates. This is similar to the loss aversion in Prospect Theory
[32]. In the social environment the alternative outcome is that of a
choice made by another person, and love of gain (gloating)
dominates. Among animals, there are strong incentives for
Figure 5. Effect of the environment on choice. (a) Participants
behaved boldly in the prudent environment and prudently in
the bold one. The lines describe the choice behavior of participants in
the two environments (continuous green and yellow lines) and of the
two computers (dotted lines). The figure is based on the logit analysis of
the choices of participants and of the computers in later trials (t.40).
The horizontal axis reports the difference between the expected value
of the first and second lottery (dev), and the vertical axis the difference
between the standard deviations (dsd). The lines have slope equal to
minus the ratio of the coefficient of dev and the coefficient of dsd. A
flatter slope corresponds to higher risk aversion. For example, a zero
coefficient on the difference in standard deviation (the participant is
indifferent to the risk of the lottery) produces a vertical line. A zero
coefficient on the expected value (the participant is only sensitive to
risk) produces a horizontal line. (b) The experience of gloating
induced the behavioral change. The total experienced emotions in
each environment averaged across participants. On a single trial we
measured the difference between the obtained outcome and the
outcome of the unchosen lottery. For each event we then summed
these differences to compute the total value of each experienced
emotion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.g005
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dominant position use their status to secure privileged access to
resources, such as food [33] and mates [34].
To explain the difference between the relative weight of gains
and losses in private and social environments one may consider the
different impact of gains and losses in the private and social
environments. In private environments, losses are particularly
harmful because they can bring an individual closer to a critical
level in terms of survival. Hence losses have to be avoided more
than gains. In social environments, rewards are frequently assigned
on the basis of a winner-takes-all rule: this is true for example in
sexual competition. With this rule, being first is much better than
being second, but the difference between second and third is not
large, since with a winner-takes-all rule the outcome is the same for
second and third. Hence behavior is driven more by the prospect
of winning than the prospect of losing.
Methods
Participants
Forty two participants participated in the experiment (29 males).
The average age was 21.5 years (62.01 years). They were
recruited via an online recruitment system. They were students at
Lyon University, who had previously joined the recruitment
system on a voluntary basis. These volunteers gave written
informed consent for the project which was approved by the
French National Ethical Committee.
Experimental design
Each experimental session lasted 80 trials. Participants did not
know each other before the experiment, and met at the beginning
of the session. They sat in the same room, each playing on a
computer, separated by a panel wall. They were told they were
about to play together at the same game but that their own gain
would not depend on the other’s choices. In each trial participants
chose one of two lotteries. A lottery is a description of two
monetary outcomes, each with a probability indicated by a sector
on a circle. All participants were presented with 40 lotteries in the
single player game, and 40 in the two player game. The set of
choices in the single and two player game were identical, and
presented in an embedded way. The order of presentation was
pseudo-randomized and was the same for all participants. The
lotteries consisted entirely of combinations of four possible
outcomes: 220,25, 5 and 20. The probabilities of different
outcomes were in the set {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. During training the
participants saw their opponent real choices. However choices of
the second player were computer simulated during the task to
control the experimental environment. In addition, this allowed us
to consider each participant as an independent observation.
Lotteries
The lotteries were paired so that no one of the two would exceed
the other in the first order stochastic dominance. In all choices, the
expected value of both lotteries is either positive (in 5 pairs of
lotteries) or negative (in the other 5). In 4 out of 10 pairs of lotteries
one of the lotteries had a higher expected value while the other one
had a lower standard deviation. In the remaining pairs, one lottery
had both a higher expected value and a lower standard deviation
than the other one. Pairs of lotteries were presented twice in each of
the four blocks, once in a one player trial, and once in a two player
trial. The order of the trials was randomized within each block (see
Annex S1 for a list of all pairs of lotteries used in the experiment).
Procedure and choice Task
The participants were instructed that they were about to play a
game with another person, that both players were going to be
Figure 6. Social gains loom larger than social losses. The figure illustrates the relationship between the theory we suggest (IUT) and Prospect
Theory [32]. The horizontal axis in both panels reports the difference between the outcome for the counterfactual choice and the outcome of the
choice made by the agent. In the left panel the counterfactual choice is the choice that the agent could have made; in the right panel the
counterfactual choice is the choice of the other agent. The vertical axis reports the utility derived from the comparison of obtained and
counterfactual outcome. In private comparisons, losses have a larger effect on utility than gains. In the social comparison the opposite is true. The
utility function reported in the left panel is similar to the value function for gains and losses assumed in Prospect Theory [32], where also losses loom
larger than gains (loss aversion).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.g006
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would sometimes be able to see the other player’s choice. The
written instructions referred to the other as ‘‘the other participant’’
or ‘‘the other player’’, never as an opponent. It was also
emphasized that their final earnings would not be dependent on
those of the other. The participants knew at the beginning of the
trial whether it was going to be a one player or a two player trial.
Each lottery was surrounded with one dotted square in case of a
one player trial or two dotted square of different color (yellow and
green: each color standing for each of the players), in case of a two
players trial. Participants could choose at any time after the
beginning of the trial. The other player choice was displayed
always after one’s choice had been made. After choice, the
participant observed an arrow spinning, and stop, on both
lotteries. He would then know how much he had won and how
much he would have won choosing the other lottery. In the two
player condition, the participant would also discover how much
the other player had won. At the end of each trial, participants had
to evaluate their emotional state. At the end of the experiment,
participants were provided with a complete oral debriefing
explaining that they did not see each other’s actual choices and
the reasons for the use of this deception. They were paid an
amount of money corresponding to the average payoff of ten
randomly selected trials.
Two computer algorithms
During training the participants saw their opponent real choices
and believed this was also the case during the game. However
choices of the second player were computer simulated during the
task in order to control the experimental environment. In addition,
this allowed us to consider each participant as an independent
observation. No participants reported any doubt about who they
were playing with during post-task debriefing. One computer was
choosing the lottery with the highest expected value in 90 per cent
of the choices, and the other the lottery with the lowest standard
deviation. Thus, the choice of the opponent that participants were
facing differed on a substantial part of the trials, 24 of the 40 two
player trials (in which the participant observed the choice of the
opponent). The differences occurred at equally distributed points
during the session. The average payoff was $ 4.125 per trial for the
bold treatment and $ 1.875 for the prudent treatment. Thus, we
had two experimental groups: 21 participants received a bold
treatment, interacting with a risk prone opponent; and 21
participants had a more prudent treatment, facing a risk averse
opponent.
Event classification
Events were classified as follows. If the trial was a single player
then the event was classified as regret if the outcome of the non-
chosen lottery was larger that that of the chosen one, and relief in
the opposite case. If the trial was a two player one, and
participants had made a different choice, then the event was
classified as envy if the outcome of the participant’s lottery was
smaller that the outcome of the other’s lottery, and gloating in the
opposite case. If the trial was a two player trial, and the two players
had made the same choice, then the event would be shared regret
or shared relief.
Electrophysiological recording
Electrodermal skin conductance responses and heart rate were
recorded with a BIOPAC MP35 data acquisition unit (BIOPAC
Systems, EU), with a 500 Hz sampling rate. Experimental sessions
took place in a noiseless room with temperature set to 20uc. SCR
recording. Two Ag/AgCl electrodes were placed on the non-
dominant hand, after cleaning with neutral soap. The tension
applied between the two electrodes was 0:5 V. We considered,
responses occurring between 1 to 3 seconds after stimulus onset and
a delay between valley to peak inferior to 5 seconds [28,35]. We
kept responses with amplitude greater than 0,02 mS [28]. Mean
SCR magnitudes were used when averaging size of SCR across
trials. Absence of measurable responseswas treatedas response with
amplitude zero. Heart rate. Two electrodes were placed on the
chest. Heart rate was computed for the 3 seconds following the
display of the outcome of the lotteries. The variation was then
computed by subtracting the heart rate during 2 seconds before the
outcome (spinning period) from the computed heart rate.
Theoretical model
We consider the value V when the participant chooses the act
(lottery) f and the alternative is g of the simple form:
Vf ,g ðÞ ~
ð
S
ufs ðÞ ðÞ dP s ðÞ z
ð
S
c ufs ðÞ ðÞ {ugs ðÞ ðÞ ½  dP s ðÞ ð 1Þ
Where S is the state set (i.e., all the possible outcomes), P the
subjective probability on it, and u is the utility function. In the one-
player trials the act g is the act that the participant has not chosen.
The theory incorporates in its second component, described by the
function c, emotional responses to the difference (counterfactual)
between the selected and the unselected act. In the more general
model the function c depends on the two terms separately, not
simply on the difference of the utility of the two outcomes. So
when the two outcomes are the same the value of this term is not
zero. The functional form is the same, but the specific c function is
different in the single and in the two player environment. In the
single player environment it only captures the counterfactual
comparison of the obtained and unobtained outcome. In the two
players it includes both this counterfactual evaluation and the
emotional effect derived from social ranking. The crucial property
of the function c is the relative weight of gains (u(f(s)).u (g(s)) and
losses (u(g(s)).u (f(s)). We can measure, as in Prospect Theory [32]
the relative weight of gains and losses. Loss aversion in private
choices can be formally described as the condition that, for any
possible value (x) of the difference between the expected outcomes
of the selected and the unselected act, 2c(2x).c(x), losses looming
larger than gains. In the two-player trials, g is the act chosen by the
other participant. If social losses loom larger than gains,
2c(2x).c(x) (envy dominates gloating) equilibria are symmetric,
and the model (Theory of interdependent utilities, see Supporting
Text S1) predicts same behavior for the two participants; instead
if gains loom larger than losses, c(x).2c(2x), (gloating dominates
envy) the equilibria are asymmetric, and the behavior of
participants should be the opposite of that of their opponent,
seeking for differences in final incomes.
Statistical Analysis
The analysis was conducted with the statistical software package
Stata, Stata Corp, College Station, TX, Release 9/SE. Non-
parametric tests were applied on the data sets since it violated
several parametric assumptions, particularly non-normal distribu-
tion of the data and high proportion of zero responses (in case of
SCR magnitude). We found no evidence of habituation effects
across the experimental session. The significance of the difference
between behavioral variables, response time and subjective
evaluations is estimated with the Wilcoxon signed rank test (non
parametric test, [5]); the hypothesis tested is that the distribution of
two random variables for matched pairs is the same. A Bonferroni
Interdependent Utilities
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Between groups differences were tested with Mann-Whitney U
test. Choice behavior was analyzed based on panel data analysis,
which takes each participant as the unit and the round as time.
Both random and conditional fixed effects were estimated, and we
report the results for the random effects analysis. The parameters
are estimated by maximum likelihood.
Choice behavior
The model used to estimate the parameters of the choice of
players is the logit:
Pr c~1 c j ðÞ ~
exp azb dev ðÞ zc dsd ðÞ ðÞ
1zexp azb dev ðÞ zc dsd ðÞ ðÞ
ð2Þ
where if evi is the expected value of lottery i; i=1; 2, then
dev;ev12ev2. Similarly, if stdevi is the standard deviation of the
value of lottery i; i=1; 2, then dsd;stdev12stdev2.
Measuring the effect of the environment on choice
We estimate with the logit regression (Tables S6 and S7) the
probability of the participant choosing the first lottery, as a
function of the difference in expected value and standard
deviation. The behavior of participants in the prudent environ-
ment is risk neutral: the dsd coefficient is very small (in absolute
value). Risk significantly predicts choices of participants in the bold
environment. The dsd coefficient is negative, which means
individuals minimize the risk when choosing; then this group is
risk averse. In figure 5a, we estimate with the logit regression the
probability of choice for the two groups (Tables S6 and S7) and
the two computers. The lines describe the choice behavior of
participants in the two environments (continuous green and yellow
lines) and of the two computers (dotted lines), as follows. We obtain
the three coefficients a, b and c from the regressions for each
group. One (a) would indicate a bias between the lottery 1 and
lottery 2 and in fact is not significantly different from zero. The
coefficient b for the difference in expected value is positive. The
last one, c for the difference in the standard deviation is negative.
The two latter coefficients give a measure of the tradeoff between
the two variables dev and dsd. The lines are the lines passing
through the origin and with slope equal to minus the ratio of the
coefficient of the expected value and the coefficient of the standard
deviation, which is {
b
c. A flatter slope corresponds to higher risk
aversion. For example, a zero coefficient on the difference in
standard deviation (the participant is indifferent to the risk of the
lottery) produces a vertical line. A zero coefficient on the expected
value (the participant is only sensitive to risk) produces a horizontal
line. The lines can be interpreted as the combination of difference
in value and difference in standard deviation that give constant
probability of choosing the first over the second lottery; as they
pass through zero, this constant probability is 1/2, the probability
of choosing lottery 1 over lottery 2 when they have same expected
value and same standard deviation. Horizontal translations of
these curves give constant probability: as they move to the right,
the probability of choosing the first lottery increases.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Interdependent Utilities Theory
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s001 (0.06 MB
DOC)
Text S2 Alternative interpretation: Discussion of the effect of
attention
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s002 (0.01 MB
PDF)
Table S1 Subjective ratings, skin conductance responses (SCR),
and heart rate variations for the different emotions. The
magnitude of the SCR is computed for the moment in which
the outcomes of the two lotteries are displayed (N=42).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s003 (0.06 MB TIF)
Table S2 Wilcoxon signed-rank test on emotional ratings for
negative emotions. The null hypothesis is that the two ratings are
the same (N=42).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s004 (0.07 MB TIF)
Table S3 Wilcoxon signed-rank test on emotional ratings for
positive emotions. The null hypothesis is that the two ratings are
the same (N=42).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s005 (0.07 MB TIF)
Table S4 Effect of obtained and unobtained payoffs on
subjective ratings. A test of the effect of unobtained outcomes on
the emotional ratings is provided by the regression. The regression
shows that even if the unobtained outcome of the chosen lottery
has an effect on the emotional ratings, it influences significantly
less the ratings than the outcome of the non chosen lottery
(Chi
2=7.71, p=0.0055). Moreover, the regression coefficient of
the TPD (two players, different choice) dummy is positive and
significant in this regression. Thus, the amplification in evaluations
due to envy and gloating, in the two player trials when the two
players made different choices, is still significant when taking into
account the potential effect of the unobtained outcome of the
chosen gamble (i.e., disappointment and elation).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s006 (0.10 MB TIF)
Table S5 Effect of obtained and unobtained payoffs on
subjective ratings in the two player condition with same choice.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s007 (0.07 MB TIF)
Table S6 Choice behavior in the prudent environment. The
table report the coefficients estimated in the logistic regression of
the choice made by participants in the prudent environment, in
the two player condition for late trials (trials.40). The dependent
variable choice is equal to 1 if the subject chose the lottery 1 and 0
if the subject chose the lottery 2. The variable dev is the difference
between the expected value of the first and second lottery (when
participants maximize expected values the coefficient is positive);
the variable dsd is the difference between the standard deviation of
the first and second lottery (a negative coefficient indicates
participants’ risk averse behavior). The behavior of subjects in
the prudent environment is risk neutral: the dsd coefficient is very
small (in absolute value).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s008 (0.17 MB TIF)
Table S7 Choice behavior in the bold environment. Same
estimate as in table S6, for participants in the bold environment, in
the two player condition for late trials (trials.40). Risk
significantly predicts choices of subjects in the bold environment.
The dsd coefficient is negative, which means individuals minimize
the risk when choosing; then this group is risk averse.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s009 (0.17 MB TIF)
Table S8 Experienced emotions. The total experienced emo-
tions in each environment averaged across subjects. On a single
trial we measured the difference between the obtained outcome
and the outcome of the unchosen lottery (in absolute value). For
each event we then summed these differences to compute the total
value of each experienced emotion. For instance, the total value of
gloating is defined as the sum of the differences between the
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outcome, when this difference is unfavorable.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s010 (0.06 MB TIF)
Table S9 Average over subjects of the number of occurrences of
each event in both environments.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s011 (0.06 MB TIF)
Table S10 The effect of experienced emotions on choice. The
table reports the coefficients estimated for the average value of the
difference in payment associated with different events in the first
40 trials (early envy and early gloating respectively) on choices
made in the last 40 trials. The variables dev, dsd and dsd *loss are
as in Table 1. The two last variables are the product of the total
value of envy and gloating in the early (first 40) trials times the
variable dsd.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s012 (0.10 MB TIF)
Annex S1 Pairs of lotteries used in the experiment
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003477.s013 (0.12 MB TIF)
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Mateus Joffily for his help in developing the
experimental task, to Marie Claire Villeval for providing access to her
lab and equipment, and to Karen Reilly and Lawrence Parsons for their
comments on an early version of the manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: GC AR. Performed the
experiments: NB. Analyzed the data: NB GC AR. Wrote the paper: NB
GC AR.
References
1. Zeelenberg M, Pieters R (2004) Consequences of regret aversion in real life: The
case of the Dutch postcode lottery. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision
Processes 93: 155–168.
2. Camille N, Coricelli G, Sallet J, Pradat-Diehl P, Duhamel JR, et al. (2004) The
involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex in the experience of regret. Science 304:
1167–1170.
3. Coricelli G, Critchley HD, Joffily M, O’Doherty JP, Sirigu A, et al. (2005)
Regret and its avoidance: a neuroimaging study of choice behavior. Nat
Neurosci 8: 1255–1262.
4. Roese NJ, Olson JM (1995) What might have been: The social psychology of
counterfactual thinking. Hillsdale, NJ, England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Inc.
5. Orthony A, Clore GL, Collins A (1988) The cognitive structure of emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 207 p.
6. Shamay-Tsoory SG, Tibi-Elhanany Y, Aharon-Peretz J (2007) The green-eyed
monster and malicious joy: the neuroanatomical bases of envy and gloating
(schadenfreude). Brain 130: 1663–1678.
7. Veblen T (1934) The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: The Modern
Library.
8. Maslow AH (1937) Dominance-feeling, behavior, and status. Psychological
Review 44: 404–429.
9. Festinger L (1954) A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations 7:
117–140.
10. Loewenstein GF, Thompson L, Bazerman MH (1989) Social utility and decision
making in interpersonal contexts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
57: 426–441.
11. Sidanius J, Pratto F (1999) Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social
hierarchy and oppression. New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press.
12. Suls J, Wheeler L (2000) Handbook of social comparison: Theory and research.
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
13. Duesenberry JS (1949) Income, saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
14. Abel AB (1990) Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the
Joneses. American Economic Review 80: 38.
15. Gali J (1994) Keeping Up with the Joneses: Consumption Externalities, Portfolio
Choice, and Asset Prices. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking 26: 1–8.
16. Gneezy U, Rustichini A (2000) Pay enough or don’t pay at all. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115: 791–810.
17. Strack F, Schwarz N, Chassein B, Kern D (1990) Salience of comparison
standards and the activation of social norms: Consequences for judgements of
happiness and their communication. British Journal of Social Psychology 29:
303.
18. Clark AE, Oswald AJ (1996) Satisfaction and comparison income. Journal of
Public Economics 61: 359.
19. Luttmer EFP (2005) Neighbors as negatives: Relative earnings and well-being.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 120: 963–1002.
20. Ferrer-i-Carbonell A (2005) Income and well-being: an empirical analysis of the
comparison income effect. Journal of Public Economics 89: 997–1019.
21. Wood JV (1989) Theory and research concerning social comparisons of personal
attributes. Psychological Bulletin 106: 231–248.
22. Buunk P, Gibbons FX (2007) Social comparison: The end of a theory and the
emergence of a field. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
102: 3–21.
23. Wills TA (1981) Downward comparison principles in social psychology.
Psychological Bulletin 90: 245–271.
24. Megiddo N (1980) On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Played by
Non-Bayesian Players. International Journal of Game Theory 9: 157–167.
25. Foster DP, Vohra R (1999) Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem. Games
and Economic Behavior 29: 7–35.
26. Hart S, Mas-Colell A (2000) A simple procedure leading to correlated
equilibrium. Econometrica 68: 1127–1150.
27. Hart S (2005) Adaptive Heuristics. Econometrica 73: 1401–1430.
28. Dawson ME, Schell AM, Filion DL (2000) The electrodermal system. In:
Cacioppo JT, Tassinary LG, Berntson G, eds. Handbook of Psychophysiology.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp 200–223.
29. Frijda NH (1986) The emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3 0 .M e l l e r sB A( 2 0 0 0 )C h o i c ea n dt h er e l a t i v ep l e a s u r eo fc o n s e q u e n c e s .
Psychological Bulletin 126: 910–924.
31. Tiedens LZ, Fragale AR (2003) Power moves: Complementarity in dominant
and submissive nonverbal behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 84: 558–568.
32. Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica 47: 263–291.
33. Barton RA, Whiten A (1993) Feeding competition among female olive baboons,
Papio anubis. Animal Behaviour 46: 777–789.
34. Mennill D, Ratcliffe L, Boag P (2002) Female Eavesdropping on Male Song
Contests in Songbirds. Science 296: 873–875.
35. Boucsein W (1992) Electrodermal activity. Wuppertal, Germany: University of
Wuppertal.
Interdependent Utilities
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 October 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 10 | e3477